Skepticism Philosophy Essay Questions

Hints on Writing Philosophy papers.

 

 

1)                It’s the arguments that count. Concentrate on reasoning. To do this, you have to be able to spot the differences between premises and conclusions, and to recognize why writers think that their premises support their conclusions.

2)                Present both sides. It is not necessary for you to come down on one side of an issue, but you can if you want. The important thing is that you do not belittle or underestimate the argument on the other side. One good technique to do this is to write one paragraph as if you’re an advocate for one side, and then criticize it as if you were an advocate for the other side.

3)                Use your own words. It is not especially valuable for you just to reproduce the statements made in class or in the textbook. If you find yourself doing that, try to figure out a way to make the same point using different words. If you can’t do it, you probably don’t understand the point very well.

4)                Quote when necessary. It’s also dangerous to use words from texts or lecture because you are risking plagiarism. Plagiarism is passing off someone elses words as your own. It is dishonest. If you want to use someone else’s words, put the words in quotation marks and tell me where you got them.

5)                Dont worry about introductory and concluding paragraphs. I’ve seen hundreds of papers that begin "For hundreds of years philosophers have argued about" and ended with "And so there are many points of view and we each must make up our own mind about what to believe." These things are both true, but theyre not relevant to any of the interesting questions.

 

Danger Signs: Things to Avoid

 

These are mostly features that I’ve found in student papers that usually lead to trouble. They are not cut-and-dried mistakes, but they seem to be associated with confused reasoning and/or passages that are difficult for your poor professor to understand. Avoid them if possible.

 

Danger Sign 1): Rhetorical Questions

 

It is unwise to try to make important points by using rhetorical questions. Here is an example of a bad way to summarize Descartes’s skepticism: "Descartes said do we really know anything?"

 

One reason that rhetorical questions are dangerous is that you (as the writer) know what the answer is to the question. But the reader (me) may not be so sure. So tell me what you think – don’t ask me a question which (you think) has an obvious answer. The answer may not be obvious to me.

 

Danger Sign 1b): Rhetorical Questions as replacements for statements.

 

As you can see in #1 above, arguments are the important things. Arguments are made up of statements not questions. The conclusion of an argument is a statement. The conclusion (for example) of Descartes’s argument for skepticism is not “Do we really know anything?”

 

Danger Sign 2): "is when" used in a definition.

 

I don’t know how this started, but it is a growing trend in papers. Here is an example: "Skepticism is when you don’t really know anything." This is a bad definition of skepticism. Skepticism is a philosophical doctrine or theory. It is not an event. Events or times are properly described by "is when," for example "Noon is when we eat lunch." Philosophical doctrines should be described by statements. They should not be reported as questions (see Danger Sign 1) or events (like "is when.")

 

Danger Sign 3): [Philosopher] also said

 

There’s nothing grammatically wrong with "also said …" (like there is for a theory described as "is when …" or as a question). However, when I see the above phrase in an exam or paper, I am warned that the student is not really following Hint #1) above. It is important to show the relations among a philosopher’s ideas – what the premises are, what the conclusions are, and how the various claims that a philosopher makes fit in with each other.

 

Statements that begin like "Descartes also said …" usually indicate that the author does not know how to relate Descartess various views to each other. She or he is simply listing all of Descartes’s beliefs, one after the other. That is not a good Philosophy paper. Sentence beginnings that are likely to be in a good Philosophy paper are the following:

 

"For this reason Descartes believed …"

 

"Descartes’s reasons for this claim were …"

 

"This position of Descartes seems inconsistent with …"

 

None of these Danger Signs is bad in itself. It is merely an indication that the author (you) is getting into trouble. If you find them in your paper, make sure that you are not confused in the ways I have described above.

 

Danger Sign 4): Naïve Plagiarism.

 

Naïve plagiarism is my term for copying passages of the text of reading assigments that were given for the class. Some students seem to believe that if they copy material out of assigned texts, that does not count as plagiarism. For example, if an exam assigns you to describe the views of Author X, some students believe that they can copy what Author X says from the textbook and hand it in. That is not an adequate response. You get no credit for copying the words of another author, even if you think that "he says it so much better than I can, I thought I’d use his words."

 

The problem is this: I need to see how well you understand the material. If you use the original author’s words, I can’t tell if you understand it or not. You need to express Author X’s opinions in your words in order for me to know that you understand his points. If you use his exact words, you don’t get credit. In fact you are plagiarizing, even though I am somewhat lenient with the problem. I do not conclude that the student has plagiarized Author X (although most professors would). Instead, I give no credit to the passage that was copied (even if it was copied with small changes, just to avoid copying exactly). So a paper that might have gotten an A, gets a C or D instead. If you plagiarize, on the other hand, you get an F not only on the exam, but also in the course.

 

Phil. 300, Fall 2006
Prof. K. DeRose
Tu, Th 9:00-10:15, CT 104

Provisional Syllabus

Brief Course Description: An investigation of the most important forms of philosophical skepticism and of the major lines of response to such skepticism.   Focus on recent work on the problem with some discussion of historical sources, especially works by Descartes and G.E. Moore.

Instructor’s Office hours: Tu 10:45-11:30, Th 12:30-1:15; CT 410
.
Books: The following books are required and should be available at Labyrinth Books, 290 York Street:

  • D: Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies; ed. J. Cottingham (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
  • S: DeRose, Warfield, ed., Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader (Oxford University Press, 1999).

Written Work:

  • 4-6page paper (typed, double-spaced), on one of several possible assigned topics (TBA), due Tuesday Oct. 17 at the start of class
  • 1-2 page proposal for the course paper, due Tuesday, Nov. 14 at the start of class (this is a real requirement and must be completed on time; writing the paper itself without first submitting a proposal does not satisfy course requirements)
  • 7-10 page course paper, due Thursday, Dec. 7 at the start of class.
  • Final Exam, December 16, 2 PM, room TBA

Please check that these dates are possible for you given the rest of your schedule before signing up for this class.

Course papers must directly and substantially critically engage with one or more of the assigned readings for our course.  Successful papers will clearly explain the issues involved and the key argumentative moves made in the readings and/or discussed in class and sections, and will also advance the discussion/argument in significant ways with new considerations or lines of argument of your own.  In most cases, a student’s best paper topic will be where she has her best idea about the material we’ve covered in the course.  Your longer paper cannot be on the same topic that your shorter paper was on.  (Yes, I will remember.)  A 1-2 page paper proposal is due on Tuesday, Nov. 14, at the start of class.  This proposal can be turned in by e-mail attachment.  It will not be given a letter grade, though the quality of the proposal will be taken into account in determining your course grade, and the course cannot be passed without completing the proposal.  Its purpose, in addition to prodding some to start work on their papers, is to give me a chance to check whether your proposed topic is sufficiently relevant to our course, and in some cases to suggest additional reading you might want to consult in writing your paper.  The course paper itself is to be 7-10 pages (typed, double-spaced), and is due on Thursday, Dec. 7, at the start of class.  This must be submitted on paper, not by e-mail.

Grading. Attendance at class meetings is mandatory; unexcused absences are grounds for failing the course, even if one’s written work is good.  All written work must be submitted on time and a satisfactory job must be done on all written work to pass the course.  Supposing that atendance is not a problem and that all written work has been satisfactory, grades will be based roughly on the following formula, though adjustments will be made for insightful classroom and for marked improvement over the course of the semester: Short Paper: 25%; Proposal: 10%; Long Paper: 40%; Final Exam: 25%.

Tentative Topics, Readings and Schedule:

The below reading list contains quite a few items written by me.  That is not because I think my own contributions to recent discussions of our topic are so important that my work deserves such representation on a syllabus for a course on skepticism. Rather, it is due to my belief about what best contributes to a good classroom discussion.  Where an instructor has (some of) their thoughts on a topic written down somewhere, I think it’s often a good idea to make them available to students in written form.  That way, students can think critically about what the instructor has to say before class.  Often, then, students are better prepared to engage in discussion — often debate! — about the material. 

Course Introduction: Sept. 7, 12

K. DeRose, "Characterizing a Fogbank...," Certain Doubts post: html link. sections 1, 2, 5, and 6 K. DeRose, "Responding to Skepticism" S, pp. 1-24; also available in draft form here: html link.

.
Descartes: Sept. 14, 19, 21, 26, 28

R. Descartes, Meditations D, pp. 12-62, 63.3-.7, 102.6-103.5, 106.3-.6 J. Van Cleve, "Foundationalism, Epistemic Philosophical Review, 1979; pp. 55-74: JSTOR link. Principles, and the Cartesian Circle," Part One K. DeRose, "Descartes, Epistemic Principles, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1992: pdf. Epistemic Circularity, and Scientia" K. DeRose, "Knowlege, Epistemic Possibility, pdf link: pp. 243-304, pp. 305-310.  and Scepticism," Chapt. 4, sections F-J, pp. 280-306

Putnam: Oct. 3, 5, 10

H. Putnam, "Brains in a Vat" S, pp. 27-42 T. Warfield, "A Priori Knowledge of the S, pp. 76-90 World: Knowing the World by Knowing Our Minds" K. DeRose, "How Can We Know That We're Not pdf. Brains in Vats," sects. 1-5, pp. 121-133

Nozick: Oct. 12, 17*, 19

R. Nozick, selections from Philosophical S, pp. 156-179 Explanations K. DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem," S, pp. 200-201 sect. 9

Unger: Oct. 24, 26, 31, Nov. 2

P. Unger, "A Defense of Skepticism" Philosophical Review, 1971; JSTOR link. K. DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem," S, pp. 210-215 sects. 15-16 P. Unger, selections from Philosophical S, pp. 243-271 Relativity

DeRose: Nov. 7, 9, 14*, 16

K. DeRose, "Solving the Skeptical Problem" S, pp. 183-219 K. DeRose, "How Can We Know That We're Not pdf. Brains in Vats," sects. 6-7, pp. 133-136 K. DeRose, "Single Scoreboard Semantics" Philosophical Studies, 2004; link(then click on "entire document") K. DeRose, "Knowlege, Epistemic Possibility, pdf links: pp. 243-304, pp. 305-310. and Scepticism," Chapt. 4, sects. A-B and E-K, pp. 243-256 and 273-309

Stroud and Sosa: Nov. 28, 30, Dec. 5

B. Stroud, "Scepticism, 'Externalism', and S, pp. 292-304 the Goal of Epistemology" E. Sosa, "Philosophical Scepticism and S, pp. 93-114 Epistemic Circularity" Dec. 7*: Wrap-Up, Review

Final Exam: Saturday, Dec. 16, 2 PM, C104

*Written work due


Links, Hand-outs, etc.

  • 9/12 handout:word.
  • “Reid’s Anti-Sensationalism and His Realism”:link (JSTOR).  This is not assigned reading; it’s just for the interested, including those who might want to write a paper on Reid’s response to skepticism.  The portion of the paper most relevant to our class discussion of 9/12 is section II.B, “The Argument for Trust,” pp. 326-331.
  • 9/14 handout:word.
  • Altston, “Epistemic Circularity”:link (JSTOR).
  • Bergmann, “Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 709-27:link (pdf doc., pre-pub draft). <–link fixed 10/10
  • Short Papers: Instructions and first topics:word. <– 3rd topic added on 10/5
  • 9/28 handout:word.
  • 10/5 handout:word.
  • Jim Pryor’s “Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper”:link (html doc.).
  • handout for 10/12, 10/17, 10/19 (Nozick):word.
  • David Lewis, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game”: clickhere(subscriber site), then on “entire document.”
  • Final examination questions and directions:word.

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